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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
International Law-Expropriation-The Act of State Doctrine
The recent case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr' is the
decision on remand of the now famous case Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino.2 The litigation arose out of the Cuban expropriation
of American properties in 1960. Farr, Whitlock and Company, a
New York sugar brokerage firm, had executed a contract to buy
sugar from Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguay de Cuba,
which was largely owned and controlled by private American capi-
tal.8 Before loading could be completed, Premier Fidel Castro con-
fiscated the properties of twenty-six corporations owned by American
interests, including C.A.V.4 In order to obtain the sugar, Farr,
Whitlock had to negotiate another contract with the Cuban Govern-
ment. Pursuant to this second contract, the sugar was sold in
Morocco. Later, Farr, Whitlock refused to deliver either the neces-
sary bills of lading or the proceeds of the sale to the agent of the
Cuban government. The Cuban bank then brought suit in a Federal
district court against Farr, Whitlock for conversion and against
Sabbatino, temporary receiver of C.A.V. for injunctive relief.
The outcome depended upon whether the so-called "act of state
doctrine" was to be applied. This doctrine, stated simply, means
that the courts of one nation will not sit in judgment on the acts of
other nations committed within their own boundaries.' Thus if the
doctrine were applied, Cuba would succeed because the court could
not question the validity of a title obtained by an act of state. If
the doctrine were not applied, the court could decide all aspects of
the case on its merits, including a determination of the validity of
the expropriation in the context of international law.
The district court' held that the doctrine was inapplicable be-
1343 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
' Farr, Whitlock & Co. will hereinafter be referred to as Farr, Whitlock.
Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguay de Cuba will be referred to as
C.A.V.
'376 U.S. at 401-2 n.3-4. The expropriation decree, Cuban Public Law
No. 851, provided a highly illusory method of compensation whereby for
thirty years the United States would have to buy more sugar from Cuba
at higher prices than any previous period in history. For a full English
translation, see 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 822 (1961).'Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 827 (1959).'Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
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cause the taking was confiscatory and thus a violation of interna-
tional law.7 Since the taking was unlawful, title had never parted
C.A.V. nor vested in the Cuban Government. The court of appeals
affirmed.8 On appeal to the Supreme Court the case was reversed
and remanded in a eight-to-one decision with a vigorous dissent by
Mr. Justice White.' The act of state doctrine was applied in a
broad manner. The mandate to the lower court specified that pro-
ceedings were to be entered consistent with the Supreme Court's
decision, but leave was given to decide other litigable issues if they
should arise.Y0
After the Supreme Court's decree and before disposition of the
case on remand, Senators Hickenlooper and Sparkman successfully
sponsored an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964.
The Hickenlooper Amendment precludes American courts from ap-
plying the act of state doctrine in cases arising out of foreign expro-
priations of American property from January 1, -1959 to January 1,
1966. The courts are to decide the cases on their merits, according
to principles of international law. But if the President advises the
court that such determination would hamper the foreign policy inter-
ests of the United States or if the taking in question does not violate
international law, the doctrine will be applied and there will be no
trial on the merits.
7 The nationalization was said to be in violation of international law
because it was retaliatory, discriminatory, and without adequate compensa-
tion. 193 F. Supp. at 384-85.
8307 F.2d 845 (1962).
° 376 U.S. 398, 439.
10 Ibid.
"The Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 § 301(d) (4), 78 Stat. 1008, 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2). The amendment reads as follows:
No court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the
federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits
giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in which a
claim of title or other right is asserted by any party including a
foreign state (or a party claiming through such state) based upon (or
traced through) a confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959,
by an act of that state in violation of the principles of international
law. Provided, that this subparagraph shall not be applicable (1) in
any case in which an act of a foreign state is not contrary to interna-
tional law ... or (2) in any case with respect to which the President
determines that application of the act of state doctrine is required in
that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the United States
and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with
the court or (3) in any case in which the proceedings are commenced
after January 1, 1966,
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The district court, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr,2 held
that the general mandate from the Supreme Court was inapplicable
because of the intervening act of Congress. It applied the amend-
ment retroactively and held that it was bound by the previous de-
cision of the court of appeals that the expropriation violated
international law.13 However, before dismissing the complaint, the
court felt that the "Executive Arm" should have sixty days-or
longer if necessary-to make a determination whether the act of
state doctrine should be applied in the interest of foreign policy.Y
4
In order to understand the importance and implications of Farr
more fully, it is necessary to consider the act of state doctrine as
traditionally applied. Probably the original reason for its existence
was the principle of absolute sovereignty of nations." In the
Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon,'6 Chief Justice Marshall stated that
"the jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is neces-
sarily exclusive and absolute,"'" and any exceptions "to the full and
complete power of a nation must be traced up to the consent of the
nation itself." 8 It would seem that Chief Justice Fuller, in Under-
2243 F. Supp. 957. Even before the decision reached the Supreme
Court, Sabbatino was released as temporary receiver of C.A.V. On remand,
the case title was amended so as to eliminate him from the proceedings.
1 243 F. Supp. at 979-81.
" On September 29, 1965, Robert M. Morganthau, United States attorney,
in a letter to Fredrick van Pelt Bryan, district judge, stated that "no
determination has been made that application of the act of state doctrine
is required in this case by the foreign policy interests of the United States."
Society of International Law, Letter to Members, Sept.-Oct. 1965, p. 3.
On November 15, 1965, Judge Bryan, in a memorandum opinion, entered
final decree in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr based upon the Morganthau
letter. It was said that since the Executive Branch had no objections to
trying the case on its merits, Cuba's complaint was dismissed and the
opinion of the court of appeals in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
307 F.2d 845 (1962), reinstated. 4 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1209
(1965).
1 See Reeves, The Sabbatino Case: The Supreme Court of the Uzited
States Rejects a Proposed New Theory of Sovereign Relations and Re-
stores the Act of State Doctrine, 32 FORDHAm L. REv. 631, 633 (1964).
Reeves praises the Sabbatino decision. For a criticism, see Stevenson, The
State Department and Sabbatino-"Ev'n Victors Are by Victories Undone,"
58 AM. J. INT'L L. 707 (1964).
1 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
"'Id. at 135.
"8 Ibid. As stated by House, The Law Gone Awry: Bernstein v. Van
Heyghen Freres, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 38, 40 (1949), the act of state doctrine
arises out of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The two are distinguish-
able in that the act of state doctrine is open as a defense to private litigants
who may have obtained expropriated property from the acting government.
In contrast, the defense of sovereign immunity is not open to the private
[Vol. 44'
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hill v. Hernandez,"9 had these considerations in mind, when in an
often-quoted dictum, he stated that "every sovereign state is bound
to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory."20
Other reasons for its existence are variants of each other and
are not mutually exclusive. They are separation of powers and the
self-imposed doctrine of judicial restraint known as "political ques-
tions." The Supreme Court in Oetjen, v. Central Leather Co."
stated that "foreign relations of our government is committed by
the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative-'the political'-
Departments of our government, and-is not subject to judicial in-
quiry or decision."22 Because of the importance of foreign relations,
the courts have felt that the national interest requires the United
States "to speak with one voice" 23 in this area. As a result, foreign
affairs has been removed from the scope of judicial review and
placed in the realm of "political questions." Consequently, the Presi-
dent has a free and unrestrained hand to carry on foreign relations
without fear of adverse decisions by the courts.24
The actions of the President in the field of foreign affairs have
had an important, though indirect, effect upon the traditional act
of state doctrine.' For example, in American Banana Co. v. United
litigant and can only be used by the sovereign or one of its agents who
has acted in his official capacity. See Zander, supra note 6, at 826, 827;
Comment, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 234, 237 n.21 (1960) ; Comment, 57 YALE L.J.
108, 113 (1947); 75 HARV. L. Rv. 1607 (1962).
" 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
" Id. at 252. It is important to note that the case was actually decided
on the doctrine of "sovereign immunity," not on the act of state doctrine.
The act of state dictum by Chief Justice Fuller was not essential to the
outcome of the case. This is pointed out in the article by Zander, supra
note 6, at 837. For other earlier decisions containing the act of state
language see Waters v. Collot, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 247 (1796); Hatch v.
Baez, 7 Hun. 596 (1876); Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 3 K.B. 532.
21246 U.S. 297 (1918).
"Id. at 302. See Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d
438 (2d Cir. 1940); Holzer v. Deutsche Reichbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y.
474, 14 N.E.2d 798 (1938); Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 266
N.Y. 71, 193 N.E. 897 (1934); Wulfson v. Russian Socialist Federated
Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24 (1923).
"Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 281 (1962) (dissenting opinion). See
also 13 MERCER L. REV. 370, 393 (1962).
" RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41,
comment a at 3 (1964) (Report on Revised §§ 41-44).
" It appears that the United States government had sometimes intervened
but solely on the question of sovereign immunity and not on the application
1966]
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Fruit Co."0 and Ricaud v. American Metal Co.1 7 the Court took
judicial notice of the State Department's recognition of the foreign
governments that had committed the alleged illegal acts. As a result,
the act of state doctrine was applied to deny recovery.28 Apparently,
the courts presumed that a trial on the merits would result in the
embarrassment of the President in his conduct of foreign affairs.29
Certain inroads have been made into the act of state doctrine
as traditionally applied. One such inroad was the "Bernstein excep-
tion."8" After a maze of litigation, plaintiff Bernstein, whose vessels
had been confiscated by Nazi Germany, was allowed recovery against
the defendant Dutch-American corporation, which had purchased
the property from Germany. The court of appeals refused to apply
the doctrine, relying on a State Department Release81 which declared
that the President had no objections to the German expropriations
cases being fully litigated in American courts. The court held that
the case could be tried on its merits and that Bernstein could recover.
of the act of state doctrine. See National City Bank v. Republic of China,
348 U.S. 356 (1955); Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945);
P. & E. Shipping Co. v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 307
F.2d 415 (1st Cir. 1962). On the governmental intervention in the sovereign
immunity cases see HACKWORTH, 2 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1941);
40 COLUmn. L. REv. 453 (1940).00213 U.S. 347 (1909).
27246 U.S. 304 (1918). It would appear that this decision was the first
one actually decided on the act of state doctrine. See Zander, supra note 6.
" 213 U.S. at 353; 246 U.S. at 309. But in at least one case, Salimoff &
Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933), it appears
that the act of state doctrine was applied even though the acting nation
(Soviet Russia) was not recognized by the United States. But see A/S
Meriland & Co. v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 189 Misc. 285, 71 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1947).
See generally WHITEMAN, 2 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 69-70
(1963).
20 See 110 CONG. REC. 19546 (1964) (remarks of Senator Hickenlooper).
00 See Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anoyme, 163 F.2d 246
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947), where Bernstein was not
allowed recovery through a reluctant application of the doctrine by Judge
Learned Hand. Subsequently, Bernstein brought a totally different action
as Bernstein v. N.V. Nedelandsche- Amerikaansche Stoomvart- Maatshappij,
173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949). He recovered in the latter action, but the act
of state doctrine was not at issue. On remand, the defendant interposed
the doctrine in its defense, and the case came to the court of appeals a
second time. This time the court amended its prior decision and did not
apply the doctrine. 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). The court relied upon the
State Department Release, note 31 infra.
" Letter From Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the Secretary of
State, to Bennett, House, & Counts, Counsel for plaintiff, in 20 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 592 (1949). "[This] is to relieve American courts from any restraint
upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts
of Nazi officials."
[Vol. 44
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The State Department later apparently adopted the Bernstein re-
lease as its permanent policy in the famous Tate letter.a2 The
Department announced that it would suggest applications of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity where the foreign taking was only
governmental in nature. If the taking were confiscatory or com-
mercial in nature, the Department would suggest that the doctrine
of sovereign immunity not be applied. Presumably, the Bernstein-
Tate approach governed prior to Sabbatino.83 However, the full
effect of Bernstein was never known since it was not appealed to the
Supreme Court because of an approved settlement. 4
The next real test of the doctrine came with Sabbatino. The
court of appeals had found Bernstein controlling because in Sab-
batino, as in Bernstein, the State Department had condemned85 the
expropriations and indicated its willingness to have the cases decided
on their merits.30 The Supreme Court, however, followed the
earlier decisions, holding that although the act of state doctrine
was not required by the Constitution, it did have "constitutional
underpinnings." 7 Thus, it apparently disregarded Bernstein3 s and
possibly obscured the significance of the Tate letter.39 The Court
also felt that judicial review by American courts of the acts of
other states might "embarrass" the Executive Branch in its conduct
of foreign affairs and "would hinder rather than further this coun-
" Letter From Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the State Depart-
ment, to Phillip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General, in 26 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 984 (1952). It is to be noted that the Bernstein Release dealt only
with the act of state doctrine, and the Tate letter spoke only in terms of
sovereign immunity. However, they were very related in that they were
authored by the same person and because their intention was the same, i.e.,
to give the wronged party his day in court. See Folsom, The Sabbatino Case:
Rule of Law or Rule of "No Law"?, 51 A.B.A.J. 725, 728 (1965); 32 U.
CINc. L. REv. 112, 114 (1963). For discussion of Tate letter see New York
& Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
" Kane v. National Institute of Agrarian Reform, 18 Fla. Supp. 116
(Cir. Ct. 1961).
"N.Y. Timies, March 18, 1955, p. 55, col. 2.
" 43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 171 (1960). The State Department's condemna-
tion of the expropriation said that it was "in its essence discriminatory,
confiscatory and arbitrary."
307 F.2d 845, 858 (1962).
" 376 U.S. at 423.
8 See Folsom, supra note 32, at 727. The Court stated that it took no
position in respect to Bernstein. 376 U.S. at 420. However the preceding
commentary infers that Bernstein was overruled.
" Folsom, supra note 32, at 727.
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try's pursuit of goals for itself and for the community of nations
as a whole.""0
Farr presented the first confrontation of the traditional act of
state doctrine, as enunciated by Sabbatino, and the Hickenlooper
Amendment, and as previously stated the district court found the
amendment applicable to all pending cases arising out of the Cuban
expropriation, including the remanded Sabbatino case itself.4" What
is more important, it found the amendment to be constitutional,
stating that it comes within the congressional power to legislate in
the areas of foreign commerce and foreign affairs.42
The commerce argument seems to be the most convincing. The
court's reasoning was that Congress had the express power, supple-
mented by the implied power of the "necessary and proper" clause,
to enact the Hickenlooper Amendment.13 This theory has been
voiced by some authorities. 44 But the amendment cannot violate
the "constitutional underpinnings" of Sabbati-no, which are said to
be the proper distribution of functions between the political and
judiciary branches in regard to foreign affairs.45 The Farr court
had no doubts that Congress could legislate in the field of foreign
affairs because Sabbatino40 and Oetien4 7 had expressly stated that
it had the power to do so. However, the question still exists whether
Congress can go so far as to realign these "proper functions." The
amendment does not convey a new area of jurisdiction upon the
courts because they have had jurisdiction from the beginning.4s
They simply have failed to exercise it properly where acts of foreign
,0376 U.S. at 416-23.
"Id. at 423.
"243 F. Supp at 964-71. The outcome of some forty cases will depend
upon the final decree in Farr. The court's retroactive application of the
amendment is open to question. Senator Hickenlooper stated dearly and
unequivocally that the amendment did not apply to Sabbatino. He said "the
amendment will lead U.S. courts to a different result from that reached by
the majority . . . in Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino. It does not
change the Court's decision in that case. . . ." 110 CONG. REc. 19559 (1964).
The court wrote this off as a casual statement made in floor debate. How-
ever, the statement was made in a series of carefully drawn questions and
answers by Senator Hickenlooper himself. There was no debate.
48243 F. Supp. at 972-76. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
"FAN, THE AFTERMATH OF SABBATINO 98-101 (1965).
"Id. at 38.
"376 U.S. at 423.
47 246 U.S. at 302.
"U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 specifically states that the judicial power
of federal courts "extends to Controversies ... between a State, or Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."
[V9ol. 44
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states were in question. But if the courts do adjudicate, will their
decisions be dictated by the President? Also, has the Congress in
passing the amendment, impinged upon the function of the Execu-
tive? If the President could be embarrassed in his foreign policy
by an adverse decision of the court as stated in Sabbatino, could
the amendment not embarrass him equally so? It would seem that
the amendment, in effect, returns us to the Bernstei4 exception,
which apparently was rejected in Sabbatino. Does this mean that
the amendment must fall also? These questions are open ones that
only the Supreme Court can answer. The constitutional question
is even more important now than when the Farr opinion was ren-
dered because Congress has made the Hickenlooper Amendment
permanent law.49
Assuming the amendment to be constitutional, what are its effects
upon international law? First, it does not destroy the act of state
doctrine. It modifies the doctrine to achieve a "reversal of presump-
tions."5 No longer will the courts have to presume that a decision
on the merits regarding a foreign act of state will embarrass the
President in the conduct of his foreign policy. Now the presump-
tion is that such decisions will not embarrass him. Of course, the
latter presumption can be rebutted by the President's suggestion
that a full determination would hinder the foreign policy interests
of the United States.51
Another effect of the amendment should be a discouragement
of foreign confiscations.52 At the same time, it should encourage
foreign investment.5 3 The Hickenlooper Amendment does not keep
foreign governments from confiscating American property; how-
ever, it does prevent confiscating governments from successfully
suing otherwise remediless defendants who refuse to pay them what
is not rightfully theirs.
5 4
Probably the most important result of Farr and its supporting
"Pub. L. No. 171, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301(d) (4) (Sept. 11, 1965).
The House favored a one-year extension of the amendment. See H.R. REP.
No. 321, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. 31-32 (1965). The Senate version was to make
the amendment permanent, S. REP. No. 170, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1965).
Finally the Senate version was enacted, deleting the last phrase of the
amendment, thus making it permanent.
'0 See 110 CONG. REc. 19557 (1964).
11 78 Stat. 1008, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2); See note 11 supra.
"2Folsom, supra note 32, at 727.
See 110 CONG. REc. 19557 (1964).
,Ibid.
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Hickenlooper Amendment should be their effect on the growth of
international law. The Supreme Court in Sabbatino felt that a re-
view of the Cuban expropriation would retard the growth of inter-
national law. "5 However, the reverse would seem to be true.5"
Since international courts have jurisdiction only when the parties
are consenting nations, many disputes between foreign states and
citizens of the United States would, through application of the act of
state doctrine, not be litigable at all. Farr, if followed should help
to fill this gap in the settlement of transnational disputes. As Mr.
Justice White pointed out in his Sabbatino dissent, our courts, under
the majority ruling, would have to validate automatically, discrimi-
natory and unlawful expropriations.57 Such acts, if they are also
permitted by the law of another nation, would then tend to become
a part of accepted international law. Needless to say, if peace and
order are to be attained through world law, there can be no place
for lawless acts that detract from the stature of international law.
International law has long been declared part of the law of the
United States." ' It would seem, therefore, that our American courts
should follow the precedents of the courts of other nations and
decide these disputes, even though they may involve acts of foreign
states, in the context of international law.59 Farr and the Hicken-
looper Amendment should achieve this result.
TommY W. JARRETT
Labor Law-Application of Antitrust Law to Union Activities-
Extra-Unit Agreements
In an effort to avoid the concentration of economic power, two
national policies have been promulgated that, ironically, result in
apparent conflict. The antitrust policy, intended to distribute power
376 U.S. at 433.
80 Folsom, supra note 32, at 727.
87376 U.S. at 439.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113 (1895).
"The courts of several countries have not hesitated to declare foreign
expropriations unlawful. See e.g., Anglo-Italian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co.,
[1955] Int'l L. Rep. 23 (Civ. Ct. Rome); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate,
[1953] Int'l L. Rep. 316 (Aden Sup. Ct.). It is also especially important
to note that the Permanent Arbitration Court in Norvay v. United States,
1 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 325 (1933), has declared discriminatory
takings to be in violation of international law.
[Vol. 44
